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The competitive consequences of horizontal mergers appear,
superficially, to be easily discernible since by definition the
merging parties were previously competitors' and the merger has
eliminated whatever prior competition existed between the par-
ties. Thus, it would seem that the inquiry under section 7 of the
Clayton Act, which prohibits corporate acquisitions that "may
... substantially lessen competition or... tend to create a mo-
nopoly,"2 would be straightforward. That is, the antitrust analy-
sis would simply focus on whether the elimination of competi-
tion between the merging parties is or could be "substantial" or
tending to monopoly. Presumably, an examination of the rela-
tive market power of the merged firm and the pre- and post-
concentration levels of the relevant market,3 coupled with a re-
view of historical information about the competitive levels of the
market, would reveal the significance of the elimination of com-
petition between the merging partners."
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thur, and Bernhard Grossfeld also made insightful suggestions on previous drafts and
Rebecca A. Halbower provided able research during the early stages of the project. Er-
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1. Horizontal mergers involve firms previously operating in the same product mar-
ket and in the same, or at least a related geographic market. The merger results in one
entrant replacing two direct competitors. In contrast, the anticompetitive effects of non-
horizontal mergers are not as readily apparent since the merging firms did not previously
compete with each other. See generally Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 226 (1960).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
3. The level or "amount" of competition in a market might be gleaned by looking
to patterns of entry and exit, and the stability and market positions of long-term en-
trants as well as their profit levels. More specifically, an attempt might be made to ascer-
tain the normal differential between price and marginal or average variable cost.
4. Frequently, reviewing courts must focus on the anticompetitive potential or
probability of a proposed merger. Although no actual proof of anticompetitive effect can
exist in that context, the language of section 7 mandates a challenge to a proposed acqui-
sition with probable or likely anticompetitive effects. Indeed, section 7 has been de-
scribed as a prophylactic statute, designed to arrest anticompetitive mergers in their in-
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Horizontal merger analysis has traditionally approximated
the above thumbnail sketch. Market shares and levels of concen-
tration, coupled with information concerning industry-wide
trends of increased concentration, were almost exclusively relied
upon as predictors of the anticompetitive consequences of merg-
ers.5 But, beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. General Dynamics,6 antitrust analysis has be-
come at once more complex and, hopefully, better able to ascer-
tain the true impact of horizontal mergers on competition.
In General Dynamics, the Court looked beyond statistical
evidence of market shares and focused on the competitive viabil-
ity of the acquired firm.7 The Court looked to the financial and
technological circumstances of the acquired company and to de-
mand behavior in the market to determine the competitive
signficance of the elimination of the company as an independent
entity. The General Dynamics Court recognized that a
financially or technologically weak company is not as significant
a competitor as its market position would indicate because its
continued ability to compete is suspect.'
Further complicating contemporary merger analysis is the
frequently made assertion that an otherwise illegal acquisition
that will increase market efficiency should be an acceptable de-
fense in an antitrust suit.9 The courts and the enforcement agen-
cipiency. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 -U.S. 294, 317, 318 n.32 (1962);
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589-91 (1957) (citing S.
REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914)).
5. See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377
U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294 (1962).
6. 415 U.S. 486 (1974). See also United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S.
86 (1975).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 38-44.
8. For example, a downward decline in the market share of the acquired firm would
be a prime indicator of a weakening position.
9. The efficiency concept is easily reduced to two separable but related general con-
cepts. Efficiency as related to a certain firm, sometimes referred to as productive effi-
ciency, refers to that firm's effective use of available resources. See, e.g., Kornhauser, A
Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 591, 592-97
(1980). Fully efficient use of resources, which may include raw materials, technology,
managerial skills, and financial wherewithal, will maximize the benefits while minimizing
the costs arising from the firm's business. In contrast, the ineffective use of resources
may threaten a firm's continued existence through inefficiency. For example, a manufac-
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cies have traditionally rejected the notion that gains in efficiency
may legitimize an otherwise illegal acquisition.10 However, the
turing firm with adequate raw materials but inadequate technology to transform those
materials into the finished product at costs which would allow the firm to be competitive
is inefficient. A merger between competing firms may pool the firms' market resources,
and provide the resulting firm with the capacity to operate more efficiently.
Allocative efficiency, on the other hand, refers to the efficient distribution of re-
sources among competitors in a particular market. This concept of efficiency is often
referred to in terms of Pareto optimality (after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto). A
market is Pareto optimal (or Pareto efficient) if there is no change in the market that
can make one better off without making another worse off. Since Pareto optimality is an
unattainable state because of voluntary market imperfections, economists often use the
Pareto concept in a relative rather than an absolute sense. Thus, if a distribution of
resources produces a gain without concomitant losses, it is said to be "Pareto superior"
to the previous distribution.
Another relational concept, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, measures the total gain and loss
of a change in resource distribution (as opposed to looking only for a gain without a
loss). A particular distribution of resources would be more efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks
sense if the gain from a previous state of affairs is sufficient to offset the loss caused to
some (even if the gainers do not compensate the losers). Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is thus
preferable to Pareto superiority in measuring efficiency increases because it permits
gains to offset losses and permits an overall calculation of the net of efficiency gains and
losses. In the real world is it usual for a market change to produce only efficiency gains?
See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEo. WASH. L.
Rv. 1, 8-10 (1982).
In a competitive sense, the allocative efficiency of the market increases if the distri-
bution of resources in the market forces competitors to maximize the use of their re-
sources in order to maintain their market shares. An efficient market should, because of
higher productivity, competitive pricing, and lower costs, result in greater consumer
welfare.
In order for a merger between competitors to produce a more efficient market, firm
(or productive) efficiencies must result in allocative efficiencies. That is, it must be
shown that the increase in efficiency of operation, etc., of the merged firm will produce a
more competitive market, i.e., a better allocation of resources.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963)
(economic advantage gained through merger that would enable merged bank to compete
better with New York banks not a relevant consideration); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (increased efficiency accomplished through the purchase
of a large retail chain of shoe stores by a large shoe manufacturer anticompetitive be-
cause the resulting integration would harm local, unintegrated retailers); In re Foremost
Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084 (1962) ("the necessary proof of violation of the statute
consists of types of evidence showing that the acquiring firm possesses significant power
in some markets or that its over-all organization gives it a decisive advantage in effi-
ciency over its smaller rivals"). Cf. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 598
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (economic efficiencies are procompetitive because compet-
itive benefits gained thereby "may stimulate matching innovation by others, the very
essence of competition"); In re General Foods Corp., 69 F.T.C. 380, 458 (1966) (Elman,
Comm'r, dissenting) (arguing that efficiencies should not be a ground for invalidation of
a merger but should be a goal for "the promotion of competition"). See also U.S. Dep't
of Justice Merger Guidelines §§ 11(10), M(14) (May 30, 1968) (increased economic effi-
ciencies not a justification for a merger, absent exceptional circumstances); U.S. Dep't of
Justice Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493, 28,502 (1982) (except in extraordinary
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attainment of efficiencies"" has increasingly been recognized as
an appropriate (some would argue the only appropriate) anti-
trust goal. 2 In the merger context, the issue is whether the effi-
ciency gains of the merged firm should offset what otherwise
might appear to be an anticompetitive acquisition. The effi-
ciency defense has striking parallels to the defenses legitimized
in General Dynamics. Both may amount to justifications that
rebut a prima facie case of illegality and both may influence
thinking as to when mergers are truly anticompetitive.
The purpose of this article will be to define the parameters
of the efficiency defense's uses in the horizontal merger context.
The article will inquire initially whether section 7 of the Clayton
Act even permits considerations of efficiency. Second, the article
will compare efficiency considerations with the General Dynam-
cases specific efficiencies not a mitigating factor).
Recently the FTC divided 2 to 2 on the question whether alleged efficiency gains
resulting from an acquisition by SCM Corporation of two manufacturing plants owned
by Gulf and Western Industries, Inc. were sufficiently large and certain to forestall an
FTC challenge to the merger. SCM had approximately 15% of the domestic titanium
dioxide market while the Gulf and Western plants produced about 8% of the same mar-
ket. Because of the failure of the FTC Commissioners to overturn a decision by the Di-
rector of the Bureau of Competition not to attempt to enjoin the acquisition, it went
unchallenged. See 45 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 751 (Nov. 10, 1983).
11. The terms "economic efficiency" and "wealth maximization" are often used in-
terchangeably to describe what common law goals are or ought to be. They are not, how-
ever, identical concepts. Efficiency is a concept used to evaluate whether the greatest
good or benefit, given obtainable resources, has been achieved, whether for a certain firm
or a certain market. See supra note 9. Wealth maximization posits that the goal of the
greatest good or benefit should be defined as wealth, thereby deviating from conven-
tional economic notions that one might want to maximize utility. See Coleman, Effi-
ciency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 509 (1980); Hovenkamp,
supra note 9, at 9-16.
12. See, e.g., R. BORK, TaE ANTrrrUST PARADOX 90-133 (1978); Dewey, The Eco-
nomic Theory of Antitrust: Science or Religion?, 50 VA. L. Rv. 413 (1964); Ezinga, The
Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U.
PA. L. REv. 1191 (1977); Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA.
L. REv. 925 (1979); cf. Carstensen, Antitrust Law and the Paradigm of Industrial Or-
ganization, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 487 (1983); Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New
Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981); Hovenkamp, supra note 9; Lande, Wealth
Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpreta-
tion Challenged, 34 HASTINGs L. J. 65 (1982); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Anti-
trust, 27 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979); Schwartz, "Justice" and other Non-Economic Goals
of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1076 (1979); Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic
Disciplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1214
(1977). See also the debate in Bork, Bowman, Blake & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A
Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 363 (1965), and Antitrust Symposium, 27 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 287 (1983).
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ics defenses in order to determine whether consideration of effi-
ciencies necessitates a different analytical approach. Third, the
efficient (or inefficient) nature of horizontal mergers in general
will be studied, and an attempt will be made to define and ex-
amine specific kinds of efficiencies likely to arise in horizontal
mergers so that the merits of individual efficiency arguments can
be ascertained. Fourth, functional and statutory requirements
will be outlined to demonstrate the pragmatic limitations of the
defense. Finally, a case for a limited qualitative efficiency de-
fense will be set forth.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 7
Section 7 of the Clayton Act is said to be prophylactic in
nature since it prohibits mergers exhibiting probable, as opposed
to certain or actual, anticompetitive effects."3 An acquisition
that may substantially lessen competition will run afoul of the
statute. However, the section's preventative quality may pre-
clude the consideration of merger-caused efficiency gains. The
key question of statutory interpretation is whether section 7 pre-
cludes any substantial lessening of competition caused by a
merger, or whether the statute is directed to substantial lessen-
ings of competition on balance. In traditional antitrust parlance
the issue is whether section 7 mandates what approximates a per
se or a rule of reason approach.1
In the context of a horizontal merger, the question becomes
whether section 7 removes a company's option to expand by ac-
13. See supra note 4.
14. A per se offense is one in which the restraint on competition is so patently
contrary to a free market system that no justification for the practice is acceptable. See,
e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2468 (1982); United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-12 (1972). A rule of reason analysis is adopted
to those practices that may have procompetitive aspects which offset the anticompetitive
effects of the activity. A balancing of both factors is mandated to determine whether the
conduct is a "reasonable" or "unreasonable" restraint of trade. See, e.g., Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F. 2d 1030 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 156 (1983). The requirement that restraints of trade be
unreasonable to be illegal is a judicial gloss on the statutory language of section 1 of the
Sherman Act that has long been recognized as necessary to render the statute workable.
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911); United States v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 177-81 (1911); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578,
600 (1898); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898).
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quiring a competitor, thereby bettering its ability to compete in
the market, if the elimination of competition with the acquired
firm is substantial. Efficiency considerations are directly applica-
ble here, because a perceived gain in efficiency may be a primary
reason for acquisition;1 that is, a gain in efficiencies through
merger may create better competitive opportunities for the
resulting firm.
If efficiency gains are relevant in the legal analysis of hori-
zontal mergers, some sort of tradeoff analysis focusing on the
elimination of competition between two direct competitors
weighed against the efficiency-endangered competitive advan-
tages gained by the merged firm against the rest of the market
must be permitted.16 In other words, is it reasonable, under sec-
tion 7, to eliminate a direct competitor by acquisition if the effi-
ciencies gained thereby will enable the merged firm to compete
better? Under a tradeoff approach, the amount of efficiency
gained would be weighed against the quantity of competition
eliminated.17 The level of concentration of the market, the mar-
ket positions of the two firms, and the competitive trends in the
market would also be gauged in order to assess the true competi-
tive impact of the merger. 8
Although it may be argued that any consideration of effi-
ciency gains would defeat the congressional intent of arresting
anticompetitive mergers in their incipiency,1 9 logic leads to the
opposite conclusion. First, section 7 prohibits mergers the effect
of which may be substantially to lessen competition. It does not
preclude any lessening of competition, only a substantial lessen-
ing of competition. This qualification seems by design, since
15. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
16. A per se approach would simply focus on whether the acquisition fostered an
anticompetitive intent or was likely to result in an anticompetitive effect. See United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). The procompetitive
effects of efficiency gains, if any, would be ignored since no balancing would take place.
17. The quantity of competition eliminated is often described as the increase in
market share resulting from the merger. See Edwards, Joffe, Kolasky, McGowan, Men-
dez-Penate, Ordover, Proger, Solomon & Toepke, Proposed Revisions of the Justice De-
partment's Merger Guildelines, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1543, 1564 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Edwards]. See also infra text accompanying notes 81-82.
18. See supra note 5.
19. See, e.g., Bok, supra note 1, at 318; Pitofsky, supra note 12, at 1064; Fox, Book
Review, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 446, 460 (1979). Cf. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 381, 397-402 (1980).
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Congress provided that such lessening of competition may occur
in "any line of commerce" or "in any section of the country."20
The statute is still a preventative one in that it does forbid
mergers that may substantially lessen competition. It does not,
however, forbid mergers that may cause any or some lessening of
competition.
In order to determine if a merger may substantially lessen
competition, the procompetitive as well as the anticompetitive
aspects of an acquisition must be analyzed. The lessening of
competition should not be considered "substantial" unless the
potential anticompetitive aspects significantly outweigh, on bal-
ance, the procompetitive potentialities of the merger.
Efficiency gains can be procompetitive if they permit the
merged firm to compete better with the rest of the market.21 Ef-
ficiencies, then, are relevent in deciding whether a merger causes
the likelihood of a substantial lessening of competition. They
20. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Detailed accounts of the legislative history of section 7
can be found in D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON AcT 20-56, 221-53 (1959); Han-
dler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act,
61 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 652-74 (1961); Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative
History, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 766 (1952).
21. Gains in efficiency achieved by a monopolist redound to the benefit of that firm
alone and serve to insulate it further from its competitors. Cost reductions may increase
a monopolist's profit margins. (Cost reductions will reduce a monopolist's price since
price is not a function of only cost or supply but is also a function of demand. However,
depending on the demand curve, lower costs may permit a greater quantity of goods to
be sold at a greater return per unit.) Entry barriers are increased since the lower cost
grants the monopolist additional pricing flexibility with which to combat new or poten-
tial entrants.
Of course, the argument is frequently made that efficiency gains can be anticompeti-
tive even when achieved by a non-monopolist because the continued ability of small,
local entrants to compete is impeded. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 344 (1962); In re Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084 (1962). Since the effi-
ciencies achieved by a non-monopolist presumably enhance that firm's ability to com-
pete, the market benefits of that increase in competitive viability may be contrasted to
the displacement or market harm suffered by smaller entrants in order to determine the
overall competitive effect of the new efficiencies. (While losses to competitors should not
be confused with diminutions in the level of competition, the disabling or exit of compet-
itors may demonstrate a lessening of competition.) The size of the more efficient firm
would be contrasted with the size of the small entrants. Further, the concentration of the
industry and the relative position of the efficient firm and of the small entrants would
have to be considered. In short, the measurements necessary to determine the competi-
tive effect of efficiency gains on the market overall present substantial difficulties, partic-
ularly when viewed in a judicial context. See text infra part III for further consideration
of the procompetitive nature of efficiencies, and text infra part VII for further elabora-
tion on the difficulties of quantifying efficiency gains.
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should form part of the equation on the procompetitive side, to
be balanced against the potential anticompetitive aspects of a
merger.
Strong policy underpinnings exist in favor of utilizing a.
traditional rule of reason analysis, encompassing efficiencies, in
the merger arena.2 Section 7 authorizes the courts to predict
which mergers are likely to be anticompetitive. Certainly weigh-
ing the likely procompetitive aspects against the anticompetitive
aspects of a merger should provide the courts with a more pre-
cise predictor, assuming an accurate measurement of each side
of the equation can be achieved. Thus, if efficiencies can indeed
be procompetitive, their consideration by courts may be neces-
sary to the equation and to the process of ferreting out only
mergers with real anticompetitive proclivities, in accordance
with the congressional purpose of section 7.
II. PRECEDENTIAL AND PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
The stage for active judicial consideration of gains in effi-
ciency in the analysis of the competitive effects of mergers seems
to be set. As noted, section 7 certainly permits and perhaps re-
quires the inclusion of efficiencies in any merger analysis. The
current Administration favors a welfare maximization approach
to antitrust enforcement generally" and has revised the Merger
Guidelines to reflect its philosophy more accurately.24 Further,
much of the influential "new learning" about industrial econom-
ics strongly favors efficiency objectives for antitrust enforcement
generally,25 and efficiency gains have been given increased atten-
22. For a historical description of the use of the rule of reason in merger cases see
W. L TwIN, LAw AND ECONOMC POLICY IN AMERICA 265-70 (1965); L. SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAw OF ANTITRUST 584-87 (1977).
23. See, e.g., Wines, Reagan's Antitrust Line-Common Sense Or an Invitation to
Corporate Abuse?, Nat'l Journal, July 10, 1982, at 1204; Singer, Big is Back in
Favor-But Only If It Promotes Economic Efficiency, Nat'l Journal, April 4, 1981, at
573.
24. U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (1982). See Sym-
posium: 1982 Merger Guidelines, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 280 (1983); Fox, The New Merger
Guidelines-A Blueprint for Micro-Economic Analysis, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 519 (1982);
Note, An Economic Analysis of the 1982 Justice Department Guidelines for Horizontal
Mergers, 67 MINN. L. Rxv. 749 (1983).
25. See, e.g., INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, H.
Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MERGERS AND ECONOMIC EFFI-
CIENCY (1980); Elzinga, supra note 12. See generally authorities cited supra note 12.
510 [Vol. 58
1983] DEFENSE IN HORIZONTAL MERGERS 511
tion in the merger context.2"
The obstacles to the acceptance of the efficiency rationale
appear to arise in some measure from the constraints of stare
decisis, from uncertainty about what constitutes a gain in effi-
ciency, and from uncertainty about whether efficiency gains are
in reality procompetitive. The Supreme Court's decision in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States2 7 is illustrative. In Brown
Shoe, the government argued that the purchase of a large inde-
pendent retail chain of shoe stores by a large shoe manufacturer
would stifle competition because the resulting integrated com-
pany would be able to undercut local unintegrated shoe stores
through efficiencies achieved by the integration. The Supreme
Court agreed, and ruled that the increase in operational efficien-
cies supported the finding of illegality, regardless of the poten-
tial benefits to consumers.28 Similarly, in United States v. Phila-
delphia National Bank,29 a case involving the merger of the
second and third largest banks in the Philadelphia area, the
Court refused to consider as a justification the argument that
the resulting bank would be better able to compete with the
larger New York banks. Although the efficiency arguments in
the two cases can be differentiated,3 0 the cases demonstrate the
Court's earlier view that merger-engendered efficiency gains are
anticompetitive because they hinder the ability of small firms to
compete.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has viewed efficiency gains
in other antitrust contexts as procompetitive.8' Recently, the
26. See, e.g., Muris, supra note 19; Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust De-
fense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 699 (1977); Jackson, The Consideration of Economies
in Merger Cases, 43 J. Bus. 439 (1970).
27. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
28. Counsel for the defendant had apparently felt compelled to take the anomalous
position that the merger produced no economies or consumer benefit. Blake & Jones,
Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 422, 456-57 (1965).
29. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
30. The Court determined that the relevant geographic market in Philadelphia
National Bank included only the Philadelphia metropolitan area. Id. at 359-61. Presum-
ably, efficiencies promoting competition only outside the relevant market could not trade
off the anticompetitive consequences in the market because of the language of section 7
prohibiting the likelihood of a substantial lessening of competition "in any section of the
country." However, consideration of those efficiencies may be important in the initial
relevant market determination.
31. See, e.g., Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 328-29, 334
(1961) (efficiencies gained by virtue of a requirements contract supports legality); Times-
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Court recognized that demonstrable economic efficiencies may
compel a rule of reason rather than a per se analysis of a partic-
ular kind of restraint.32 Furthermore, the reasonableness analy-
sis, once found appropriate, often amounts to a balancing of the
efficiencies achieved against the supposed anticompetitive ef-
fects of the restraint. For example, the Court recently held, in
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,3 s that a rule of
reason approach was mandated for vertical non-price restraints
because while such restraints reduce intrabrand competition,
they promote interbrand competition.3 4 According to the Court,
efficiencies achieved in the distribution of the manufacturer's
products promoted interbrand competition. 5 The majority be-
lieved that insulating retailers from intrabrand competition
would enable them to promote and service the product better,
thereby improving the products' competitive position in relation
to competing products.3 s Thus, efficiencies were not only
thought to be procompetitive, they were the only procompetitive
trait set forth by the Court to justify a rule of reason approach
for that class of restraints.
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 623-24 (1953) ("unit plan" which
required advertisers to place ads in both newspapers owned by defendant achieved oper-
ating efficiencies and supports finding that plan did not substantially affect competition).
Cf. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (efficiencies achieved
through market division and cooperative buying by competitors do not support deviation
from per se rule for territory allocation among competitors).
32. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), where the
Court found that exchanges of prices and other information among competitors may
sometimes "increase economic efficiency and render markets more rather than less com-
petitive. For this reason, we have held that such exchanges of information do not consti-
tute a per se violation of the Sherman Act." Id. at 441 n.16 (citing United States v.
Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975) and United States v. Container Corp.,
393 U.S. 333, 338 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
33. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). The Court was thus willing to balance procompetitive ef-
fects in one market against anticompetitive effects in another, in contrast to its refusal to
engage in a similar tradeoff analysis in a horizontal market allocation case six years ear-
lier. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
34. 433 U.S. at 54. In so holding, the Court expressly overruled United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), which had applied a per se rule to vertically
imposed customer restrictions where the manufacturer actually sold its product to the
party it was seeking to restrict.
35. 433 U.S. at 58.
36. Id. at 54-55. See Gerhart, The "Competitive Advantages" Explanation for In-
trabrand Restraints: An Antitrust Analysis, 1981 DuKE L.J. 417; Pitofsky, The Sylvania
Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. Rav. 1 (1978);
Strasser, Vertical Territorial Restraints After Sylvania: A Policy Analysis and Pro-
posed New Rule, 1977 DuKE L.J. 775.
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With respect to mergers, the Supreme Court seems only a
small step away from sanctioning efficiency gains as a procompe-
titive effect of mergers, in spite of the troublesome precedents of
Brown Shoe and Philadelphia National Bank. As noted, the
Court's decision in General Dynamics7 was a watershed of
merger jurisprudence. The so-called General Dynamics justifica-
tion defenses permitted by that decision mandate, in effect, a
rule of reason analysis, and may set the stage for the judicial
recognition of an efficiency defense.
General Dynamics involved the government's challenge to a
merger of coal producers.3 8 The government's approach was to
demonstrate that the acquisition would materially increase the
relevant market share of the acquiring company, thus signifi-
cantly advancing a trend toward concentration in an already
concentrated market.,3 The Court expressly recognized that the
government's statistical proof had established a prima facie vio-
lation, but permitted the merger nonetheless." The Court found
it necessary to look beyond the statistical evidence of concentra-
tion levels to the "structure, history and probable future" of the
coal industry in order to assess accurately the likely competitive
consequences of the merger.41 The government's proof concern-
ing the amount of market foreclosure and market concentration
would support a finding of "undue concentration," but only "in
the absence of other considerations.
'42
In analyzing the coal industry, the Court found that the de-
mand for and method of selling coal had changed. The acquired
company turned out to be unable to compete vigorously for new
37. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
38. Through a series of stock transactions, General Dynamics had become the
country's fifth largest commercial coal producer. The government challenged a 1959 ac-
quisition of United Electric Coal Company stock by Material Service Corporation, which
was later acquired by General Dynamics. It was alleged that the acquisition substantially
lessened competition in the sale and production of coal in the Eastern Interior Coal
Province, one of the four major coal producing areas in the country (encompassing Illi-
nois, Indiana, and parts of Kentucky, Tennessee, Iowa, Minnesota, Virginia, and Mis-
souri). Id. at 490.
39. Id. at 494. The number of coal producing companies operating in Illinois had
decreased from 144 to 39 between 1957 and 1967. The acquisition had increased the
market share of the top two producers by either 14.5% or 22.4%, depending on the
relevant market. Id. at 495.
40. Id. at 496-97.
41. Id. at 498.
42. Id. at 497-98.
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long-term supply contracts because of very limited uncommitted
coal reserves. 43 Since almost all coal was sold for future delivery
pursuant to long-term supply contracts, the acquired company
was a far less significant competitor than its market share, which
was based on past and present sales, indicated.4 According to
the Court, the lower court's conclusion that the government's
statistical case did not, when taken in context, indicate a likely
anticompetitive merger was justified.
The General Dynamics decision, in permitting defendants
more flexibility in justifying their acquisitions, represents a dras-
tic departure from the analysis used in earlier merger cases.45
However, General Dynamics provides few guidelines for lower
courts to follow and could arguably be limited to its unique
facts.48 Nonetheless, the decision has been influential. A number
of lower courts have followed General Dynamics and have at-
tempted to look to the business and economic realities of the
relevant market to assess probable competitive effects. Courts
have allowed mergers where one company is shown to be a
financially or technologically weak firm upon the theory that the
elimination of such a "noncompetitor" from the market cannot
43. Id. at 501-02.
44. United, the acquired company, ranked fifth among Illinois coal producers in
annual production but ranked tenth in reserve holdings. It controlled less than one per-
cent of reserve holdings in Illinois, Indiana, and western Kentucky. United had already
been forced to close several mines because of depleted reserves. Id. at 502-03. See also
United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975) (government's section
7 claim rejected because "the market-share statistics gave an inaccurate account of the
acquisitions' probable effects on competition").
45. These earlier cases include United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270
(1966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Conti-
nental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See Rogers, Perspec-
tives on Corporate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 301, 304-11
(1981); Kirkpatrick & Mahinka, The Supreme Court and the "New Economic Realism"
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 Sw. L.J. 821 (1976); Lurie, Mergers Under the Bur-
ger Court: An Anti-Antitrust Bias and Its Implications, 23 VmL. L. REv. 213 (1978). See
generally Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of
the Chicago School, 1982 Sup. CT. Rxv. 319; Sullivan, Economic Jurisprudence of the
Burger Court's Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. RaV. 1
(1982).
46. General Dynamics has granted horizontal merger defendants substantial am-
munition with which to combat section 7 allegations. However, the decision has resulted
in some uncertainty and inconsistency in the lower federal courts. See Ponsoldt, The
Expansion of Horizontal Merger Defenses After General Dynamics: A Suggested Recon-
sideration of Sherman Act Principles, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 361 (1981).
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substantially lessen competition.47
Since the elimination of a weak, inefficient company may
not reduce the level of competition in the market, the "noncom-
petitor" rationale is consistent with, although not as extreme as,
allowing an efficiency defense. Further, if the resulting firm be-
comes a more vigorous competitor from the new combination of
capital and assets, the elimination of an inefficient, ineffective
firm can be viewed as procompetitive. 48 Gains in efficiency may
frequently result from the purchase of a technologically or
financially weak firm. Moreover, efficiencies perceived by the ac-
quiring firm are often what made the acquisition attractive in
the first place. 9
47. See, e.g., United States v. International Harvester, 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977);
Lektro Vend. Corp. v. The Vendo Corp., 500 F. Supp. 332, 360-62 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re The
Pillsbury Company, 93 F.T.C. 966, 1011, 1015 (1979). Cf. RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d
1317 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1975). The
General Dynamics defenses are closely related to and sometimes confused with the "fail-
ing company" defense. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969);
United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78 (D. Colo. 1975). The essential difference is
that the failing company doctrine provides an absolute defense if the doctrine's require-
ments are met. The General Dynamics defenses are not absolute, but simply require
further inquiry into the competitive effect of the acquisition. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 49-52. See also United States v. Healthco, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 535 F.2d 1243 (2d Cir. 1975); Laurenza, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Failing Company: An Updated Perspective, 65 VA. L. REV. 947 (1979).
48. See Kolb, The Impact of Business Realities in Recent Potential Competition
and Horizontal Merger Cases-The Government Can Lose, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 955
(1978); cf. Ponsoldt, supra note 46, at 376-91.
49. This statement is not uncontroverted. It is sensible to posit that an acquisition
is attractive to the acquiring firm only if efficiencies or other factors which will provide a
competitive return on investment are likely to result. See, e.g., Turner, Conglomerate
Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1313, 1354 (1965); White
House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, Report on Antitrust Policy (1968) (statement of
Robert H. Bork). But, at least in the horizontal context, an acquisition may occur simply
to add to the acquiring firm's existing market share. The market may yield a high return;
thus the acquisition of a competitor may be attractive for that reason alone. However,
where the acquired company is technologically or financially weak, some efficiency gain
should result, even in a high return market.
The question of corporate control may also undercut the proposition that efficiency
gains are central to decisions to merge. Berle and Means believed that the diffusion of
stock ownership largely immunized corporate management from effective shareholder,
i.e., ownership control. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY 69-118 (1932). Although shareholders are interested only in profit max-
imization, managers may be guided, at least partly, by different goals, such as increasing
the size of the firm managed. The divergence of goals may be attributable to the fact
that the pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards that managers receive, such as salaries,
bonuses, stock options, and promotions, may be more closely tied to the firm's growth
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While an efficiency defense may superficially appear to be
substantively as well as analytically similar to the justification
defenses of General Dynamics, closer inspection reveals material
differences. The General Dynamics Court treated proof of the
acquired company's limited coal reserves as rebuttal evidence to
the government's prima facie statistical case.5 In essence, the
defendant's evidence discredited the accuracy of the statistical
proof and cast substantial doubt on the purported anticompeti-
tive impact of the merger.
Evidence of efficiency gains might also rebut a prima facie
case of illegality, but in a somewhat different manner, assuming
that a showing of efficiency gains exhibits some potential
procompetitive effects of a given merger.51 An efficiency defense
admits to the reliability of statistical proof of anticompetitive
effect, but argues that the lessening of competition demon-
strated by the evidence of market foreclosure is outweighed by
the efficiency benefits to the resulting firm and to the market. 2
The analysis closely parallels the traditional rule of reason bal-
ancing test: the anticompetitive aspects of the merger are
weighed against the increased ability of the merged firm to com-
pete by reason of efficiencies achieved through the acquisition.5
rate than to its profit levels. See, e.g., R. POSNEsR & K. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORA-
TION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 195-231 (1980); Williamson, Managerial Discre-
tion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 1032 (1963). It has been argued, how-
ever, in contradistinction, that a strong incentive for management to maximize profits
exists to forestall takeover bids by those who believe that the firm would be more profit-
able if "properly managed." See, e.g., Holl, Control Type and the Market for Corporate
Control in Large U.S. Corporations, 25 J. IND. ECON. 259 (1977); Mandelker, Risk and
Return: The Case of Merging Firms, 1 J. FIN. EcoN. 303 (1979). If management goals do
vary from profit maximization, the increased discretion afforded management by dif-
fused ownership suggests that acquisitions sometimes occur for pure growth reasons
rather than for efficiency or profit motives. See Rogers, supra note 45, at 314-17.
50. 415 U.S. 486, 496 (1974).
51. But see supra note 21. See also infra text Part III.
52. The market structure should be taken into account so that efficiency gains that
benefit the resulting firm are shown to aid the competitive level of the market. See supra
note 21.
One could argue that efficiency evidence rebuts the accuracy of a prima facie statis-
tical case since the foreclosing of competition between the merging partners does not
affect that market as appears from the proof of foreclosure because of the enhanced
ability of the merged firm to compete through gains in efficiency. Either way, the effi-
ciency proponent must show that the market is better off because of its (the merged
firm's) new efficiencies. •
53. The size of the before and after firms and the level of concentration of the
market are crucial determinants. A merger of a competitive firm with 5% of a concen-
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The efficiency defense, then, promotes a balancing test; the
General Dynamics justification defense does not necessitate an
argument that the merger will actually be procompetitive. The
acquisition of a financially or technologically weak competitor
does nbt have to be procompetitive (although it may be) to rebut
effectively a prima facie case. The weak or noncompetitive ra-
tionale does not require a balance of likely competitive effects;
rather, it posits that the merger is not as anticompetitive (or
simply is not anticompetitive) as the percentage of market fore-
closure of the merger, taken alone, indicates. 4 Under either ap-
proach, the section 7 requirement of a likely lessening of compe-
tition is not met, yet the efficiency defense can be seen as a
procompetitive sword while the weak competitor defense resem-
bles an anticompetitive shield.
It is important to note that the "trading off" of the procom-
petitive and anticompetitive effects of a merger required by the
efficiency defense involves an analytically distinct step that goes
beyond the weak competitor justifications approved in General
Dynamics. A merger may achieve efficiencies when neither of
the merged partners is financially or technologically disadvan-
taged.5 5 Thus, while General Dynamics may open the door to
efficiency considerations to a limited extent, it does not address
the threshold issues of whether efficiencies should be considered,
and, if so, what role they should be accorded in the horizontal
merger context.
Although analytical differences exist between the General
Dynamics defenses and efficiency justifications, the procedural
similarities appear pronounced. Both would be used to rebut a
prima facie violation and would have the effect of giving the
trier of fact additional discretion. The weight to be accorded jus-
trated market to a weak, capital poor firm with 5% of the same market might produce
efficiencies which would outweigh the direct loss of competition. It is likely, however,
that such a merger would be considered legal without regard to efficiency considerations.
See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493, 28,502 (1982).
Thus, a key question is when should efficiency gains be a determinate or the determinate
factor in the legal analysis of a horizontal acquisition. See infra text accompanying notes
158-60.
54. In contrast, the failing company defense was characterized in General Dynam-
ics as the "lesser of two evils" approach in which the competitive thrust of the acquisi-
tion is measured against the adverse impact on competition (including business losses) if
the acquired company goes out of business. 415 U.S. at 507.
55. See infra text Parts III and IV.
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tification evidence to rebut a prima facie violation is within the
province of the trier of fact. A reviewing court can reverse the
trier of fact's determinations only for errors of law, that is,
where the fact finder's conclusions are not supported by sub-
stantial evidence. This standard of review gives the trier of fact
considerable discretion when evaluating the defendant's justifi-
catory proof. The defendant has, in effect, nothing to lose by
proffering evidence to rebut a prima facie case as authorized by
General Dynamics.6
Consideration of gains in efficiency would also augment the
fact finder's discretion by permitting it to balance the procom-
petitive effects of the new efficiencies against the anticompeti-
tive consequences of the market share increase achieved by elim-
ination of two direct competitors.57 Once again the defendant
would have the opportunity to defeat a prima facie case, in this
instance by arguing that the merger is in fact procompetitive.
The added discretion that consideration of efficiencies would af-
ford the trier of fact would arguably parallel the General Dy-
namics rationale expanding analytical flexibility in order to
identify more accurately mergers with real anticompetitive
consequences."
The added flexibility produced by permitting economic jus-
tification evidence is subject to abuse, however, and may work to
subvert the courts' active consideration of gains in efficiency.
Afraid of what has been characterized as the pairing of opportu-
nism with "information impactedness,"5 9 courts may be fearful
of the accuracy and representativeness of justification data. The
party contending that the merger will increase the efficiency of
the market has far better access to the relevant data and can use
this advantage to disclose and argue the economies involved se-
lectively. Of course, the modern rules of discovery are aimed at
56. When the trier of fact is convinced by the defendant's evidence, the effect is to
limit the reach of section 7, at least as it was generally interpreted prior to the General
Dynamics decision. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
58. The added discretion afforded the trier of fact may permit mergers that exhibit
substantial anticompetitive tendencies. Too much flexibility in the hands of novice fact
finders may create aberrant results. For example, the fact finder may consider some, but
not all, of the relevant market and demand factors in reaching a result. See, e.g., United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 511 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
59. See Williamson, supra note 26, at 703.
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reducing these types of advantages, 0 but the government none-
theless may have a difficult burden in demonstrating the incom-
pleteness or distortion of the data.61
Further, the added discretion afforded the trier of fact pro-
vides greater opportunity for a court to manipulate the outcome
according to its own predispositions and prejudices about the
breadth of section 7, even to the extent of defeating the congres-
sional intent underlying the statute. Indeed, the dissent in Gen-
eral Dynamics took grave exception to the majority's treatment
of the rebuttal evidence, stating that its synthesis fell far short
of considering all relevant factors and reflected "a deep-seated
judicial bias against section 7 of the Clayton Act. '6 2 The same
type of criticism could be leveled at judicial treatment of effi-
ciency justifications and can, of course, come from either the
proponents or the skeptics of efficiency.
A more fundamental problem, sometimes termed "bounded
rationality,"6 s confronts the use of economies in the merger con-
text. Our legal system may simply be ill-equipped to deal with
sophisticated economic arguments put forth in an adversary con-
text. Part of the problem lies with the fact that most judges and
lawyers are not economists. But the main obstacle may arise
from the incompatibility of economic theory with the legal sys-
tem as manifested in the litigation process." The balancing of
efficiency gains against competitive loss in a horizontal acquisi-
tion is illustrative. Measuring potential operational or capital
benefits to the workings of the resulting firm against the effect
of the elimination of one firm from the market presents a real
challenge to the courts' powers of perception and comprehen-
sion. If the balance struck is an intuitive one made by a judge
with a lay knowledge of economics, it might be preferable to ex-
clude efficiency considerations altogether.
Thus, the inability of courts to deal accurately with diver-
gent economic arguments may be inherent in a system that
seeks to arrive at truth through an adversarial process. Absent
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
61. Williamson, supra note 26, at 703.
62. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 527 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
63. Williamson, supra note 26, at 702.
64. Id. See also Bok, supra note 1, at 228.
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some analytic framework, decipherable and applicable by legal,
as opposed to economic, arbiters, efficiencies, while clearly rele-
vant to merger analysis, may prove intractable.6 5 One of the ma-
jor goals of this article is to outline such a decisional framework.
This task is particularly important since, as noted, the enforce-
ment authorities and the judiciary seem more receptive to an
antitrust philosophy that is, at a minimum, cognizant of effi-
ciency considerations. Thus, a workable analytic framework is
needed to insure competent, predictable judgments in accord
with the statutory design of section 7.
III. EFFICIENCIES, COMPETITIVE EFFECTS, AND THE TRADEOFF
REQUIREMENT
The underlying assumption thus far in this article has been
that efficiency gains are, at least sometimes, procompetitive. It
is, of course, crucial to determine if that assumption is war-
ranted and, if it is, to define the limits of its validity.
First, recognizable differences exist between "real" or allo-
cative economic efficiencies that will improve the ability of the
merged firm to compete and will increase competition in the
market, and merger-induced "pecuniary" efficiencies that result
only in money savings for the firm.6 For example, advertising
advantages occasioned by an acquisition may not provide con-
sumers with proportionately more information upon which to
make an informed purchasing decision. The additional product
65. See Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282,
313 (1975).
66. See F. MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF SELLERS' COMPETITION 217-25 (1952);
Blake & Jones, supra note 28, at 459. I use the terms "real" and "pecuniary" efficiencies
hesitantly; they should not be confused with economists' use of real and pecuniary econ-
omies of scale. Those terms refer to different methods of achieving scale economies. For
example, product specialization may attain real economies by reducing the amount of
materials and labor needed to produce a unit of output. Large size may also provide cost
savings through an increased ability to exact price concessions from suppliers, resulting
in pecuniary economies of scale. See J. BAIN, BARRImRS TO NEW COMPETITION 57 (1956);
F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 104-108 (2d
ed. 1980). In contrast, my use of those terms encompasses the marketplace. That is, effi-
ciencies are real if, by providing cost savings to a firm, they (1) enable that firm to better
compete in the market, and (2) that enhanced ability results in increased competition
overall in the market. Efficiencies are pecuniary if the cost savings do not benefit compe-
tition in the relevant market, for example, through the raising of artificial entry barriers
or the entrenchment of a dominant firm. Presumably, the gains are then firm and not
market oriented. See supra note 9 and infra text accompanying notes 68-75.
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exposure results in cost savings for the merged firm but pro-
duces little consumer benefit.67 Competition and entry may be-
come predicated on large promotional campaigns designed to
saturate the public and create artificial product differentia-
tions."' Thus, the advertising "efficiencies" may heighten entry
barriers--by adding to artificial consumer preferences going be-
yond the relative advantages of the product. Viewed in that
light, gains in efficiency produce no market benefit and may be
deemed anticompetitive. 9
It can be argued that the distinction just urged is more ap-
parent than real because all efficiencies created through merger
inure to the benefit of the resulting firm. That is, all economies
result in cost savings, albeit sometimes indirectly, for the acquir-
ing firm, whether the savings are achieved through operational
improvements such as the combining of research and develop-
ment departments, through capital improvements such as mod-
ernized production facilities, or through the advertising advan-
tages that product diversification allows. But economies that
benefit the merged firm do not necessarily have the same effect
on competition.
Thus, the position of the firm in its relevant market must be
considered in measuring the competitive impact of efficiency in-
creases. If antitrust law indeed seeks to protect competition
rather than competitors, 0 then efficiencies are relevant as a
procompetitive factor only when they produce a more competi-
tive market.71 Presumably, the ultimate reckoning of the effi-
ciency rationale must rest on purchaser benefit. By increasing
67. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).
68. See Address by Donald F. Turner on Advertising and Competition, delivered
before the Briefing Conference on Federal Controls of Advertising and Promotion, Wash-
ington, D.C. (June 2, 1966), reprinted in M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H.
GOLDSCHMID, TRADE REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 1036-39 (1975).
69. Of course, a merger creating scale economies that enable the resulting firm to
achieve the same advertising scale and output as existing competitors may be deemed
procompetitive. Generally, however, advertising economies are not dependent on the
market position of the advertiser and are thus not necessarily market beneficial.
70. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
71. An indirect dispersal of the efficiency gains to the market must occur. The dis-
persal effect (in terms of competition) occurs when the efficiency increase enhances the
competitive capabilities of the merged firm and that creates a more competitive relevant
market. The level of concentration in the market and the position of the acquiring firm
before and after the merger are the crucial determinants of the latter requirement. See
infra text accompanying note 74.
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competition, incentive to the seller to reduce prices and costs
intensifies and society has more goods available at lower cost.
Efficiencies gained through a merger that does not result in
a more competitive marketplace aid only one competitor-the
resulting firm-and not competition in the marketplace as a
whole. 72 The new firm reaps the benefits of the new efficiencies,
for example, through lower costs, which may lead to larger profit
margins.
Thus, the externalities that separate real economic efficien-
cies engendered by an acquisition and efficiencies that serve only
the resulting firm are the nature of the market and its relation-
ship, before and after the merger, to the firm.74 Merger-induced
efficiencies always redound to the benefit of the resulting firm;
the essential question is whether those efficiencies will enable
the firm to compete in a way that produces a more competitive
market. For example, efficiency gains that permit a firm to en-
croach upon a concentrated market or at least aid the firm to
become a more viable competitor in a market that is already
competitive should be deemed "real" efficiencies. Merger-caused
economies that either serve to create or entrench a dominant or
leading firm are not procompetitive because there are no indica-
tions that anything but larger profit margins will accrue. 5
The significance of "real" efficiencies gained may vary ac-
72. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
73. Additionally, the firm could decide to lower prices to undercut its competition
and further increase its market share. This assumes an unchanging demand and new
firm costs which are less than most rival firms in the market. See also supra note 21.
74. Efficiencies thus require a partial equilibrium analysis, involving the examina-
tion of one market with the assumption that extra market conditions that may affect the
market remain unchanged or have a negligible effect. In contrast, a general equilibrium
analysis considers the interdependence of quantities and prices of markets on each other.
A general equilibrium analysis would further complicate the consideration of the value of
efficiencies. Absent evidence that the relevant market is interacting significantly with
other markets, it should perhaps be dispensed with on those grounds. See Williamson,
supra note 26, at 702 & n.10. Of course, interaction or interdependence with other mar-
kets may simply be an argument for expanding the relevant market definition.
75. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271,
279 (1964). In that case, Alcoa, the market leader with 27.8% of the aluminum conductor
market attempted to acquire Rome Cable, which had 1.3% of that market. The merger
was prohibited because the high concentration level already in the market militated
against even slight increases in concentration. The entrenchment theory is particularly
prominent in product or geographic extension acquisitions. See infra note 76 and accom-
panying text.
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cording to the type or class of acquisition involved. For example,
the anticompetitive effects of product or geographic extension
mergers are not as readily apparent as with a merger between
two direct competitors. The former class of acquisition does not
add to the acquiring firm's existing market share; the competi-
tive impact is predicated upon the likelihood of the acquired
firm's entrenchment in its market 6 or upon the elimination of
the acquiring firm as a perceived potential market entrant.77 In
contrast, the competitive impact of a horizontal merger is imme-
diate and direct; two competitors become one and the acquiring
firm's market share is expanded accordingly.
Thus, the conflict between efficiency gains and impacts
upon competition are most pronounced in the horizontal merger
context. Further, because most mergers are challenged just
before or shortly after culmination, the proponent of the merger
can only argue for potential or probable efficiencies, as con-
trasted with the actual elimination of competition caused by the
combination of two rivals. Of course, the effects of the elimina-
tion are still uncertain at this stage,7 8 but, contrasted with the
conjecture and uncertainty attendant to potentiality argu-
76. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); In re General
Foods Corp., 69 F.T.C. 380 (1966). Cost advantages gained by an acquired firm are often
viewed as anticompetitive when the acquired firm is likely to become more dominant
through its acquisition by a larger, deep-pocket, buyer. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 78 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Cupples), 233 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Mo. 1964), af'd, 382 U.S.
12 (1965) (per curiam).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. United States,
405 U.S. 562 (1972); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
Similarly, with respect to a vertical merger, supply or sales opportunities for competitors
may be curtailed or foreclosed. Existing competitors may eventually be forced to inte-
grate upstream or downstream to compete and similar entry barriers may impede new
competition. A vertical merger does not add to one's market share, it simply adds an
additional market. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962);
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); Reynolds Metals
Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co.,
288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. IMI. 1968); United States v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), 253 F.
Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966).
78. For example, a merger between firms with 7% and 10% market shares results
in a firm with a 17% market share (although whether the firm will hold or increase that
position is difficult to forecast). It is difficult to ascertain, however, the impact of that
aggregation of market shares on the level of competition in the market, that is, whether
the gap between the price and the marginal cost of competitors is reduced or increased.
524 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
ments,' 9 proof of anticompetitive impact is likely to be more
convincing. In any event, an argument based on a tradeoff of
efficiencies against direct competition reduction presents acute
analytical difficulties, since the anticompetitive and procompeti-
tive aspects appear so divergent. Cases involving a substantial
elimination of competition but with significant new economies of
scale may prove formidable absent judicially usable measuring
gauges.80
It is apparent that proposed efficiencies must be deemed
procompetitive before they can become part of a decisional
equation. Further, their evaluation as procompetitive depends
on the nature of the market. The size of the merged firm before
and after the merger must be compared to the level of concen-
tration (that is, the competitiveness) of the relevant market.
Only then can efficiencies legitimately be deemed beneficial to
the market and thus procompetitive. In essence, a pre-balancing
test evaluation of efficiency gains is necessary before the
problems of weighing divergent competitive factors become ripe.
Once a determination is made that merger-induced efficien-
cies are procompetitive in a market sense, the tradeoff or balanc-
ing analysis, in which the procompetitive gains achieved through
79. See Note, Horizontal Mergers After United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,
92 HAiv. L. REv. 490, 508 (1978).
80. The 1968 merger guidelines pointed out that "there usually are severe difficul-
ties in accurately establishing the existence and magnitude of economies claimed for a
merger." U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines § II(10) (May 30, 1968). Similarly, the
new merger guidelines observe that "[p]lausible efficiencies are far easier to allege than
to prove. Moreover, even if the existence of efficiencies were clear, their magnitudes
would be extremely difficult to determine." U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, 47
Fed. Reg. 28,493, 28,502 (1982). The new guidelines permit the Justice Department to
consider efficiency gains only "in extraordinary cases" where "clear and convincing evi-
dence" of substantial economies is shown. Id. at 28,502. But the guidelines further state
that "in the overwhelming majority of cases, the guidelines will allow firms to achieve
available efficiencies through mergers without interference from the Department." Id.
The simultaneously issued Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines refer to the
efficiency defense as a "difficult issue." The FTC Guidelines support the use of efficiency
gains for prosecutorial discretion purposes at the precomplaint stage but conclude "that
there are too many analytical ambiguities associated with the issue of efficiencies to treat
it as a legally cognizable defense." Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines, [Jan.-
June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1069, at 1251, Special Supp. (June 17,
1982). Commissioner Miller dissented, asserting that scale-type efficiencies should form
part of the legal analysis. See also supra text accompanying notes 63-65. Professor Wil-
liamson has asserted that the difficulty of a quantitative assessment does not mean that
no consideration of efficiencies should be undertaken. See Williamson, supra note 26, at
731.
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efficiencies must somehow be measured against the anticompeti-
tive effects of the acquisition, becomes appropriate. As noted, in
a horizontal merger a competitor is eliminated from the market,
resulting in an increase in market share for the acquiring firm.
Thus, the tradeoff analysis specifically requires that efficiency
gains be measured against the increase in market share.
But an increase in market share does not necessarily denote
a substantial lessening of competition. 1 Increases in market
share are troublesome when an increase in market power results.
Market power is often defined as the ability of a firm to decrease
output and raise prices.8 2 Thus, the tradeoff analysis need be un-
dertaken only when the elimination of competition confers an
additional degree of market power on the resulting firm. Other-
wise, the merger will not meet the statutory requirement of a
substantial lessening of competition and the efficiency justifica-
tions are unnecessary.
IV. INTERNAL EXPANSION
At least one further obstacle confronts the successful use of
an efficiency argument. Theoretically, a court sympathetic to ef-
ficiency considerations might enjoin an acquisition, even though
the party defending the merger convincingly asserts that the
gains in efficiency resulting from the acquisition in question are
market beneficial and that those procompetitive benefits out-
weigh any anticompetitive consequences deriving from the
merger.
The additional hurdle arises from the bias ingrained in sec-
tion 7 favoring internal expansion. Section 7 prohibits only
growth by acquisition, and the courts have frequently pointed to
the possibility of internal (or de novo) market entry by an ac-
quiring firm to support a finding of illegality.83 Since section 7
81. See Edwards, supra note 17, at 1564. If it did, every horizontal merger would
be in violation of section 7.
82. See Muris, supra note 19, at 384.
83. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 567-68 (1972); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 345 n.72 (1962); United States v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey),
253 F. Supp. 196, 227 (D.N.J. 1966). The term "de novo entry" is not a synonym for
internal growth or expansion in the horizontal context because a firm expanding horizon-
tally by opening up new plants or production facilities is not a new market entry. De
novo entry typically refers to the internal expansion of a firm into a different market.
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discourages growth and entry by acquisition, the courts gener-
.ally consider internal expansion and market entry de novo a
more competitive alternative."4 In the horizontal merger context,
internal expansion probably does have a more positive effect on
competition. Merger between competitors necessarily eliminates
one market entrant, while a firm's internal growth, with a capital
investment roughly paralleling that involved in the acquisition
of a competitor, normally increases market capacity and produc-
tivity without any offsetting loss to competition. 5
Thus, in the case of merger-engendered efficiencies, the
courts should inquire whether the same advantages could be
achieved by internal expansion. For example, if an acquisition
produces substantial economies of scale through increased ca-
pacity for production, a court might properly inquire whether
the acquiring firm's merger capital could have been used to ex-
pand the firm's existing production facilities rather than to
purchase the assets of a competitor.86
Requiring an acquisition to satisfy this additional hurdle
would have two demonstrable effects on merger litigation. First,
it would further complicate consideration and analysis of effi-
ciencies, increasing the problems of bounded rationality and in-
formation impactedness8 7 Second, the vitality of the efficiency
rationale as a defense or justification would be limited to the
extent that efficiencies achieved by an acquisition could be du-
84. For example, in a market expansion merger the acquiring firm gains market
entry by purchasing an existing entrant. The anticompetitive consequences may arise
from the elimination of the acquiring company as a potential market entrant or from the
ability of the acquiring firm to entrench the existing entrant in an already concentrated
market. See cases cited supra notes 76-77. Market entry in the same circumstances by
internal expansion (de novo entry) may have many of the same anticompetitive conse-
quences; however the entry will be "neglected" by the antitrust laws unless and until the
new entrant threatens to gain monopoly power. Section 7 would not apply because no
acquisition has occurred.
85. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345 n.72 (1962). Stated
another way, internal expansion increases output while mergers do not (absent econo-
mies which reduce costs).
86. The feasibility of internal expansion as an alternative to growth by merger and
the desirability of introducing it into the legal analysis are the source of uncertainty and
disagreement. Compare, e.g., 4 P. ARERDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 946 (1980)
with Muris, supra note 19, at 389-92. The courts are unlikely, however, to ignore the
possibility of internal expansion given the existing judicial authority. See, e.g., supra
note 83 and cases cited therein.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
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plicated by internal expansion. 8 Even assuming that the trade-
off analysis described above favors the merger, the additional
step of considering internal growth alternatives would be re-
quired before the acquisition could be permitted.
V. ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND INTEGRATION
The question of the usefulness of the efficiency defense re-
mains unanswered. It is, so far, uncertain when efficiency argu-
ments should prevail in the horizontal merger context. Further,
it is unclear whether the structural and analytical impediments
arising from Section 7 create biases that render arguments based
on gains in economies superfluous. For example, does section 7's
partiality for internal expansion render efficiency arguments in-
effectual because of the likelihood that any merger-produced
economies could have been achieved without the elimination of a
competitor from the marketplace through internal expansion?
The merger defendant seeking to prove efficiencies must
first show cost advantages resulting from the combination that
would not have otherwise occurred. 9 Since he must convince the
court that efficiency gains outweigh anticompetitive conse-
quences attendant to the merger, he would seem to need demon-
strable quantitative evidence to establish the defense. Certainly
the measurement of efficiencies presents substantial theoretical
and empirical difficulties.90 But in the merger context, measure-
ment is comparative, and although the broad questions perhaps
cannot be ignored entirely,91 analysis of the relationship of costs
before and after the merger focuses the question and plainly
identifies the defendant's task.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 126-27. See also Turner, supra note 49, at
1320-21.
89. In addition, the proponent must demonstrate that the efficiencies outweigh the
elimination of a competitor from the market, resulting in a market that is more competi-
tive overall. The proponent must further demonstrate that internal expansion could not
have achieved the same result. See supra text Parts I and IV.
90. For example, on a general level, the relationship of scale economies to size is
the source of continuing debate. Compare Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial
Concentration in INDUSTRAL CONCENTRATION: THE Naw LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, H.
Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974) with McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, in INVus-
TRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING 55 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston
eds. 1974).
91. That is, broad questions about whether size inherently produces cost savings
are relevant in any given case.
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Thus, the defendant must identify the kinds of efficiencies
likely to result from a horizontal acquisition and analyze them
with respect to the obstacles that a successful defense shouild
overcome. Merger-produced efficiencies can generally be classi-
fied into scale economies and integration economies, although a
specific efficiency may result from both. In the horizontal con-
text, however, the primary concern lies with scale economies.
Scale economies involve the achievement of the minimal op-
timum size for firm operation.9 2 Attainment of this minimum
size reduces the average cost per unit of manufacturing and mar-
keting a product and results in a cost advantage over "smaller"
competitors.s The firm then has a competitive advantage over
smaller rivals; it can undercut their selling prices and invade
their markets or meet their price and gain a greater return per
unit sold. Thus, firms below the optimum minimum size may
combine to achieve a lower cost of production or marketing in
order to equal or exceed the scale economies of competitors.
Mergers of direct competitors, involving the combination of pro-
duction facilities, distribution systems, research and develop-
ment capabilities, and perhaps management, may provide par-
ticular opportunities for the attainment of economies of scale.94
Economies of integration occur when a firm integrates pro-
duction, promotion, or distribution functions formerly per-
formed outside the firm, and thus reduces the unit costs of doing
business.9 5 For example, a firm may decide that it is cheaper to
distribute its product itself rather than through an independent
middleman, or it may save by undertaking the manufacture of
92. Scherer, supra note 90, at 16-18.
93. F. SCHERER, supra note 66, at 81-84. Optimal scale or size occurs when size
permits long run average total cost to be at the minimum possible. Minimal optimal
scale reflects the smallest size at which the average total costs can be achieved. Note,
Economies of Scale: Weighing Operating Efficiency When Enforcing Antitrust Law, 49
FORDHAM L. REv. 771, 775 (1981).
94. It is generally believed that scale economies are more likely to be realized in
horizontal mergers than in vertical or conglomerate acquisitions. See, e.g., Blair, The
Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 GEo. L.J. 672, 679-80 (1958); Turner,
supra note 49, at 1317.
95. Williamson refers to these efficiencies as transactional economies since costs are
saved in the manner in which a firm transacts its business. He asserts that "mergers for
conventional scale-economy reasons are much less common than mergers for transac-
tional-economy reasons." Williamson, supra note 26, at 723. See also Williamson, The
Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1443
(1974).
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supplies or the ownership of materials previously bought from
others.
Vertical mergers, which may include, for instance, the ac-
quisition by a producer of retail outlets or supply firms, are
often motivated by perceived economies of integration.96 More-
over, integration economies, while normally not of primary im-
portance, may result, at least theoretically, from horizontal
mergers. The combination achieved through a horizontal acqui-
sition may do more than increase the size and productive capac-
ity of a firm; it may also add new properties or attributes to the
firm. For example, a strong research and development depart-
ment may be added to a stagnant one. To the extent that inno-
vative research and development lowers costs by streamlining
the production, manufacture, or distribution of the firm's prod-
uct, economies of integration will have resulted from the merger.
The increased quality rather than the increased size of the com-
bined research and development department would, in this in-
stance, be responsible for the cost savings. Similarly, the acquisi-
tion of a struggling company by a healthy competitor may
produce economies through the use of capital for improvement
of the production facilities of the acquired firm. Again, the
achievement of a minimal optimum size would not necessarily
have produced the cost savings resulting from modernized
equipment .
7
Economies of scale and economies of integration, although
distinct, may be intertwined, at least for the purpose of estab-
lishing an efficiency defense for some kinds of mergers. That is,
as Areeda and Turner have pointed out, it may often be neces-
sary to prove the existence of both to authenticate the defense.9 8
Consideration of both types of economies appears most likely in
vertical mergers, because the minimal optimum size for produc-
96. The very efficiencies sought and achieved by vertical integration have been
viewed as anticompetitive because of the advantages achieved over nonintegrated rivals.
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); U.S. Steel Corp. v.
FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 603 (6th Cir. 1970); In re Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084
(1962). See generally P. STsiNER, MERGERS: MoTIVEs, EFFECTS, POLICIEs 58-69 (1975);
Dean & Gustus, Vertical Integration and Section 7, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 672 (1965).
97. That is, the efficiency achieved may or may not result from a scale economy.
The "integration" of the two general types of economies in this context presents addi-
tional identification and measurement problems for the efficiency proponent. But see
infra text accompanying note 102.
98. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 86, 948, at 172.
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tion of component parts, distribution, or research and develop-
ment may differ from the minimum size necessary for the effi-
cient manufacture of the product itself. Acquisition of a
component part manufacturer or independent distribution sys-
tem by a manufacturer will not produce economies of scale, as-
suming differing minimal optimal sizes, unless significant econo-
mies of integration exist.99 Nor will vertical integration of a
component part plant with a principal manufacturing plant pro-
duce economies of scale absent the existence of economies of in-
tegration, because the cost of production will remain the
same.100 However, if economies of integration do exist, then the
integration may produce economies of scale if the cost of pro-
duction is reduced, because the minimal optimum size for the
production of the entire product, component part included, has
been attained.
As noted, economies of integration may result from horizon-
tal mergers. The existence of economies of scale, however, does
not normally appear to depend on the finding of economies of
integration in such lateral firm combinations. For example, at-
tainment of the minimal optimum plant size through the acqui-
sition of a competitor is typically independent of the economies
of integration that might be achieved through the integration of
advanced manufacturing equipment owned by the acquired firm.
Both an increase in quality through an advancement in technol-
ogy and an increase in size may produce cost savings, that is,
result in efficiencies, independently of each other. A company
that has achieved a minimal optimum production size may ac-
quire a competitor with an advanced research and development
department solely to reduce costs through technological ad-
vancement. Of course, in some situations both types of econo-
mies may result; a firm may achieve both size economies and
integration economies in research and development if the combi-
nation permits it to reach a minimal optimum size for R & D
while also providing access to technological advances. T0
99. Id. at 172-73.
100. The minimal optimum size of production of the component part or of the
principal product is unaffected by the merger unless the integration of the manufactur-
ing plants produces cost savings.
101. Ascertaining the scale economies and the integration economies likely to re-
sult from an acquisition that will both increase the size and provide technological ad-
vancement may present insurmountable measurement difficulties, particularly given that
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The defendant in a horizontal merger case faced with the
task of quantifying purported efficiency gains will typically focus
on measuring increases in economies of scale flowing from the
merger, since economies of scale appear to be the principal effi-
ciencies gained from lateral acquisitions. The complications of
measurement where economies of scale are dependent upon a
gain in integration economies are avoided. In addition, a focus
on scale economies enables the defendant to avoid quantifying
integration economies at all, except in the rare instances in
which integration gains may be sizeable enough to be outcome
determinative. 10 2 Horizontal acquisitions may present the best
opportunity, pragmatically, for an effective efficiency defense, at
least to the extent that scale economies predominate and are
more easily measurable than other kinds of efficiencies.1 os
Economies of scale can be achieved at the plant, multi-plant
or firm, or specific product level.104 Thus, the kinds of scale
economies that arguably may result from horizontal combina-
tions include plant scale economies, 05 and economies in distri-
the economy gains are typically prospective in nature. See supra notes 77-79 and accom-
panying text.
102. The ability to separate scale from integration economies avoids the difficult
measurement problems which inure with integration economies and the added measure-
ment problems that the combination of two types of efficiencies brings.
103. Diseconomies of scale, such as the inability of management to control a multi-
plant firm effectively, may also arise. At some point, diseconomies may outweigh econo-
mies of scale, or, theoretically, larger firm size would always produce lower unit costs;
that is, bigger would always be more efficient.
104. Plant scale economies may occur where per unit production costs are lowered
by the effective utilization of high volume machinery which spreads set-up costs over a
larger production run and enables workers to specialize. Generally, larger plants incur
lower unit costs because the size of the labor force and the amount of equipment or
machinery does not increase proportionately with capacity.
At the firm or multi-plant level, scale economies may be realized for research and
development, sale promotion, and product distribution because large fixed costs can be
covered by a larger volume of sales. See Wentz, Mobility Factors in Antitrust Cases:
Assessing Market Power in Light of Conditions Affecting Entry and Fringe Expansion,
80 MICH. L. REv. 1545, 1589 n.127 (1982); F. SCHERER, supra note 66, at 133-38. The cost
of raising capital may also be lower for large firms, although the cost differential appears
to be relatively insignificant. See F. SCHERER, A. BECKENSTEIN, E. KAUFER & R. MURPHY,
THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-PLANT OPERATION 287 (1975).
105. Plant specialization economies are a variant of plant scale economies and oc-
cur when a firm produces a range of products or product sizes rather than a single prod-
uct. For example, a firm may have a plant with sufficient size to produce one product
efficiently, but the plant may not be large enough to produce several products efficiently.
A merger of two one-plant firms might make specialization economies possible. The
economies thus achieved would be significant if competitors in the market typically of-
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bution, procurement, 10 6 promotion, capital cost, research and de-
velopment, and management.1 07 Of course, more than one kind
of scale economy may exist, leading to a possible aggregation ar-
gument-an efficiency proponent may argue that the merger
achieved several different economies and that the economies cu-
mulatively justify the acquisition, even though each economy
taken alone might not support a defense.
VI. PROVING AN EFFICIENCY DEFENSE
Generally, a firm seeking to establish an efficiency defense
must first establish the existence of premerger diseconomies to
set the stage for proving an increase in efficiency.108 That is, it
must show that other firms in the market have economies of
scale or other efficiencies not achieved by the premerger firms. It
can prove new efficiencies simply by showing that an increase in
size, in this case by merger, decreased its unit costs of produc-
tion, thus enabling it to operate more efficiently. If, however, the
court adopts the additional constraint that the efficiencies
achieved must produce a more competitive market,109 then prov-
ing efficiencies in this manner would be insufficient to support
an efficiency defense. A dominant firm could establish new effi-
ciencies by the same rationale; an increase in size would reduce
its costs and enable it to become even more dominant.110 Thus,
fered a complementary line of products. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 86, 11
951-952, at 177-81.
106. Procurement economies could presumably include both the cost of obtaining
needed supplies or materials and the cost of raising capital, here referred to as capital
cost.
107. Here the line between scale and integration economies may sometimes be dif-
ficult to draw. The size of a firm may reflect the cost of using in-house professional or
management services provided by accountants, lawyers, and the like. A large firm may
thus make more efficient use of these services. But a merger which effects a replacement
of inefficient management with more efficient management achieves integration rather
than scale economies. In that situation the size of the merged firm is irrelevant; the
economies are achieved through the replacement of old management brought about by
the merger.
108. Firms that are already "efficient," that have achieved a minimal optimum size
for operation, presumably cannot avail themselves of the defense.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 66-77.
110. However, Professor Scherer suggests that at some point an increase in size will
no longer achieve additional cost savings. A firm's minimal optimum size identifies that
point. See F. ScHR, supra note 66, at 84. This absolute use of minimal optimal size
differs from the "comparative" use of minimal optimal size, used in this article to denote
when a firm can achieve efficiencies which would tend to make the market more competi-
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for purposes of establishing an efficiency defense, the firm
should show the existence of efficiency disadvantages, for exam-
ple with regard to economies of scale, of other market entrants.
The acceptability of an efficiency defense should rest on a
showing that the merger will produce a more competitive mar-
ket.111 The proponent thus needs to demonstrate that the
merger will produce a firm better able to compete and that the
resulting firm's competitive enhancement will produce a more
competitive market. A showing that other entrants have pre-
merger cost or size advantages which are lessened or eliminated
by the combination is then a necessary step for an efficiency de-
fense. Relational diseconomies indicate the possibility that the
merger will have a procompetitive effect on both the resulting
firm and the market.
112
Further, proof of premerger scale diseconomies must be re-
quired of both merging firms. A successful efficiency defense
must establish that the combination produces a more efficient
competitor whose enhanced competitive capabilities outweigh
the elimination of competition between the merging companies.
The joining of an already efficient firm (that is, a firm that has
already achieved the minimal optimal scale extant in the mar-
ket) to an inefficient small firm would not create the additional
efficient competitor necessary to the defense."1 ' An inefficient
competitor might be eliminated, but a more efficient firm would
not result, at least in relation to the rest of the market. No
tradeoff could occur because the anticompetitive effect from the
elimination of two direct competitors could not be offset. 4
tive, i.e., when competing firms have cost advantages owing to their larger size. See supra
text accompanying notes 92-95.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 57-64.
112. That is, comparison of the firm to the market is necessary to avoid the possi-
bility that the merger will produce a more efficient dominant firm or otherwise result in a
further concentration of the market. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
113. In contrast, the failing company defense requires proof that only one of the
merging firms needs improvement. It is arguable that a merger between an already ef-
ficient firm and a small, inefficient firm that is not a failing company should be permit-
ted to advance the efficiencies defense where merger is the only opportunity for the small
firm to become competitively viable. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 86,1961,
at 196.
114. The tradeoff analysis assumes that the anticompetitive effects of the merger
meet the statutory requirement that a substantial lessening of competition is likely to
occur. If, without consideration of procompetitive economies, the substantiality test is
not met by the plaintiff/government, no violation has occurred and efficiency considera-
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As noted, the statutory design of section 7 favors internal
expansion. 115 The legislative bias supports the position that,
even if substantial economies result from an acquisition, those
economies should not be considered relevant unless the defend-
ant can show that the same efficiencies could not have been
achieved by internal growth.116 Similarly, the influence of effi-
ciency gains may be diminished by the possibility that other
mergers may be preferable. For example, it may be that a
merger with a firm outside the inefficient firm's market, i.e., a
nonhorizontal combination, producing a related product, would
achieve the same economies as the challenged merger.11  Less
likely is the possibility that acquisition of a smaller firm in the
market would yield the same economies of scale as the disputed
combination.118
The possibility of preferable alternative mergers seems fur-
ther to complicate judicial consideration of an efficiency defense.
A related product combination might well achieve scale econo-
mies comparable to those achieved by the acquisition of a direct
competitor, where, for example, product distribution systems or
research and development are highly complementary. If alterna-
tive possible mergers are to be considered at all, the alternatives
should be sharply limited to those that might match or exceed
the specific economies claimed by the defendant. The cost of ac-
quisition should also be comparable. These constraints eliminate
the prospect of an argued relevance for largely dissimilar acqui-
sitions, perhaps more costly, which might produce more but dif-
ferent efficiencies.119 The problems of measuring integration
tions are rendered moot. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
116. See also infra text accompanying notes 125-27 concerning burden of proof
and the extent to which internal expansion alternatives should be considered in the effi-
ciency defense context.
117. See 4 P. AREDA & D. TURNER, supra note 86, 961, at 197 n.3.
118. The acquisition of a firm smaller than that targeted would, of course, corre-
spondingly reduce the anticompetitive effect of the merger by the market share differen-
tial of the targeted and smaller firm. But since economies of scale are related to firm size,
such an alternate merger would fall to achieve the same economies unless that merger
would achieve the firm's minimal optimum size in the relevant market. That is, if the
acquisition of a smaller firm would grant the resulting firm the same scale economies as
the major competitors, the target acquisition could be attacked on the grounds that the
same efficiencies could be achieved by the elimination of a lesser competitor. The "trade-
off" analysis that this approach necessitates would undoubtedly be difficult to quantify.
119. Also avoided is judicial interference with corporate acquisition goals. A firm
may acquire another to achieve specific efficiencies; judicial consideration of alternative
534 [Vol. 58
1983] DEFENSE IN HORIZONTAL MERGERS 535
economies against scale economies or of comparing different
kinds of scale economies are also avoided, and the rebuttal to
the efficiency defense focuses only on realistic alternative acqui-
sitions. Further, alternative acquisitions that are preferable from
an efficiency perspective but which are not feasible alternatives
for other reasons should not be relevant, as the obstacles to ac-
quisition would preclude the efficiencies from ever being real-
ized. That type of comparison is thus merely fanciful and is not
pertinent to the efficiency defense.
The use of only product-related, nonmarket alternative ac-
quisitions that match the specific economies of the challenged
merger raises an additional burden of proof question and com-
plicates resolution of the efficiency defense even further. Assum-
ing that the burden of proof in establishing the defense lies with
the defendant, does this burden include establishing that no fea-
sible merger alternatives exist, or should the burden shift to the
complainant once the defendant has shown that efficiency gains
outweigh competitive losses? This question is further confused
because the speculative, anticipated economy gains resulting
from the merger must be compared to the speculative, antici-
pated economy gains from another speculative combination.120
Thus, the preferable merger argument introduces added uncer-
tainties into the decisional equation.
The burden of proof concerning preferable mergers should
be with the complainant both for policy and pragmatic reasons.
It is much simpler for the complainant to establish the existence
of a preferable alternative than for the defendant to show that
no reasonable, preferable alternatives exist. Further, if prefer-
ences are pinpointed by the complainant, the defendant, to re-
tain its efficiency defense, would be forced to confront the asser-
tion that the proposed alternative would produce the same or
similar economies without the concomitant lessening of competi-
tion.12 1 Alternatively, the defendant could attempt to demon-
strate the nonfeasibility of the "preferable" merger as a viable
substitute acquisition.
1 2
mergers that would result in a similar quantity but a different quality of efficiencies
would effectively transfer corporate decisionmaking to the court.
120. Mergers are typically challenged prior to 6ulmination or, if after culmination,
before any definitive proof of economies is demonstrable.
121. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
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From a policy perspective, requiring the efficiency propo-
nent to show no preferable alternatives as part of its burden of
persuasion in establishing the efficiency defense would seem to
vitiate the defense, even though the proponent had shown the
merger to be procompetitive.12 The statute does not require
such a limited rendering of the defense where the economies
outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition.
124
Similar complications arise if the possibility of internal ex-
pansion is included in the efficiency calculus. Conjecture about
economies that might result from internal expansion is compara-
ble to the prospective assertion that economies will arise from
the combination. The comparison of prospective scale economies
should be subject to the prior requirement that internal expan-
sion be shown to be a viable alternative to acquisition. 12 5
The prospect of scale economies through internal growth is
an attractive one; the firm becomes more efficient and thus more
competitive without the market's loss of a competitor. And the
bias of the statute in favor of internal growth is evident. 12 But
does the statutory bias require a court to examine internal
growth possibilities if an efficiency defense is otherwise estab-
lished? If the proponent can demonstrate that likely scale econ-
omy gains exceed the competitive loss resulting from the elimi-
nation of a market entrant, that is, that the merger is on balance
procompetitive, must the efficiency proponent further establish
that no even more procompetitive alternative, internal expan-
sion, exists?
Assuming that internal expansion considerations become
part of the efficiency calculus, burden of proof issues again arise.
As with the preferable alternative merger issue, placing the bur-
den of proof on the complainant to establish the viability and
123. If the efficiency proponent has established that, on balance, the acquisition is
not likely to substantially lessen competition, it serves no purpose to require the propo-
nent additionally to show that no other, more procompetitive options exist.
124. Section 7 requires a finding of a likelihood of substantial lessening of competi-
tion. It does not require that a merger interfere with competition as little as possible. An
efficiency defense should not fall because of possible alternative acquisitions except in
borderline cases in which it is not certain that the gains in efficiency are sufficient to
rebut the anticompetitive aspects of the merger.
125. That is, the same concerns here apply as in the preferable alternative merger
situation. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
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propriety of internal expansion seems justified, assuming that
the defendant has successfully shown the purported acquisition
to be procompetitive. To place the burden on the defendant to
demonstrate the nonfeasibility or impropriety of internal expan-
sion would again unduly limit the scope of the efficiency defense
and would increase the ludicrous possibility that a merger which
is demonstrably procompetitive might be enjoined under section
7 simply because it is not the most procompetitive action possi-
ble. 12 7 The decisions that have pointed to the prospect of inter-
nal expansion have typically done so in the context of reviewing
an anticompetitive merger.128 Those cases do not necessarily es-
tablish a precedent for a combination which is, through consid-
eration of the efficiency defense, shown to be pro-competitive.
VII. QUALITATIvE EFFICIENCIES
Leaving questions of alternative modes of expansion aside,
some judicially usable method of comparing efficiency gains with
increases in market share must be derived if the defense is to
have any real validity. Professor Williamson has developed a
model, labeled the Naive Tradeoff Model, 129 which argues that a
small gain in efficiency offsets a relatively large gain in market
power. He concludes that even a small drop in costs will gener-
ally yield a net efficiency gain, thus creating a presumption that
127. It can be argued that the burden of persuasion should remain with the effi-
ciency proponent for two reasons: (1) the evidence concerning internal growth is within
its direct control, and (2) the statutory bias favoring internal expansion counsels for re-
quiring a defendant asserting an efficiency defense to show the lack of internal growth
possibilities that would equal the economies gained through merger. But this argument
fails to take into account the absolute nature of a successful efficiencies argument. If
successful, the efficiency proponent has already shown that there is not a likely substan-
tial lessening of competition. To require it to do more serves no purpose and is not re-
quired by the statute.
128. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
129. The model is illustrated by the following figure:
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the merger is beneficial.130 Of course, the Williamson presump-





The model assumes that the premerger market has only two firms and that they have
identical costs. AC, is the combined average premerger cost of the firms while AC, re-
flects the postmerger cost. P, and Q are the premerger price and quantity, P, and Q, the
postmerger levels. Thus, the hypothetical merger has both lowered costs and raised
prices. The shaded area L is said to represent the deadweight loss from the increased
market power while G represents the gain from increased efficiency. Thus, if those asser-
tions are correct, the merger would produce a net benefit if G exceeds L, despite in-
creased price, decreased output, and increased profits to the firm. If L exceeds G the net
competitive effect is negative. See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18, 21-23 (1968); Williamson, Economies as an
Antitrust Defense: Correction and Reply, 58 Am. ECON. REv. 1372 (1969); Williamson,
Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM. EcoN. Rav. 105 (1969); Wil-
liamson, supra note 26. See also Muris, supra note 19, at 384-93.
130. Williamson argues that the efficiency savings would be realized over the entire
period of production of the goods, while the loss comes only from sales not made as a
result of the increase in price. See Williamson, supra note 26, at 709; Muris, supra note
19, at 386-99.
131. Posner argues that Williamson's analysis is incomplete because the expected
profits from the merger will generate an equal level of costs through premerger jostling
for acquisitions and additional postmerger competition (e.g., new services, etc.) which
will use up merger profits. That is, decreased output is not the only loss resulting from
mergers. Posner concludes that the shaded area L in the Williamson model does not
accurately reflect merger loss. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83
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not solve the problem of measuring actual efficiencies in a spe-
cific acquisition. It is rather a model which seeks to demonstrate
that the tradeoff of cost reduction for market power is generally
procompetitive if nontrivial economies are achieved.
Actual measurement of scale economies, although depend-
ing on the type of economy involved, 3 2 has generally involved
use of empirical studies. The four methods most commonly used
by economists include statistical cost studies,133 engineering
studies,3 profitability studies,'m and survivorship studies."3 '
J. POL. ECON. 807, 821 (1975). But cf. Williamson, supra note 26, at 713-23; Muris, supra
note 19, at 392 n.41. See also Jackson, supra note 26 (Williamson's presumption not
valid because fails to account for effects of premerger market power). Further, if the
Naive Tradeoff Model accurately reflects the quantity loss and price increase of the hy-
pothetical merger, it would seem to benefit the merging firms at the expense of consum-
ers (who are paying higher prices while the firm absorbs lower costs). Such a result would
be expected where a duopoly becomes a monopoly and would surely violate section 7
since that statute speaks only to competition and not to efficiency. The Naive Tradeoff
Model eliminates competition even if it does increase efficiency. But thd-real difficulty
with the theory lies with measuring the allocative efficiency effects of a merger in an
oligopolistic market (the merger must produce efficiency increases for the market) which
can be used to offset the loss from price increases and output losses.
132. Obviously, technical efficiencies such as plant or multiplant scale economies
are easier to quantify than nontechnical efficiencies such as improved research and de-
velopment or management.
133. Statistical cost studies rely on cost accountants' data on cost, outputs, and
other characteristics of plants of varying size. Standard statistical techniques are used to
estimate cost-scale relationships. Such studies suffer from unavailable or inadequate cost
data as well as differing statistical inferences that are drawn from the data. The utility of
such a measurement device in litigation would appear minimal given the scarcity of relia-
ble cost information generally. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MERGER STANDARDS UNDER
U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS 112-13 (Monograph No. 7, 1981); McGee, supra note 90, at 65-68;
Note, supra note 93, at 781.
134. Engineering studies make use of engineering cost estimates of industrial engi-
neers to measure the efficiency of various new plants or technical processes. The difficul-
ties of accounting variances are avoided and measurement of each level of production is
more direct. However, nontechnical efficiencies such as research, management, and en-
trepreneurial ability are excluded. In addition, the dynamics of technological change are
ignored and biases upon the type and valuation of costs considered mitigate the value of
such methods. See ABA ANTrrRUST SECTION, supra note 133, at 111-12; F. SCHERER,
supra note 90, at 19; McGee, supra note 90, at 68-80; Note, supra note 93, at 782.
135. Profitability studies attempt to measure the profit levels of whole firms, typi-
cally by use of statistical or accounting methods. The vagaries of methodologies used
may produce different conclusions; further, such studies do not seem to isolate profitabil-
ity with efficiencies. See, e.g., J. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR
AND PUBLIC POLICY 177 (1972) (profits reflect monopoly power as well as economies). Cf.
Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & EcoN. 1
(1973); W. SHWhman, MARKET POWER AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 26-34 (1970) (positive
relationships found between market share and profitability).
136. The survivorship technique classifies firms by size and observes the success
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Statistical cost studies and engineering studies are more precise
and more suitable for antitrust purposes since they can be uti-
lized to focus on the actual cost savings of technical processes
achieved through merger. 1 7 Both methods tend to ignore non-
technical efficiencies and may suffer from inadequate or nonexis-
tent data, particularly in the section 7 context where the effi-
ciency gains are often prospective in nature.138
Even assuming that empirical evidence of cost savings is
available and reliable, courts may be disinclined to grant much
weight to the proof because of pragmatic difficulties involved in
applying the tradeoff analysis. That is, the comparison of cost
savings with increases in market share may provide the courts
with no answer about the overall competitive effect of the
merger.13 9 The ultimate question is what amount of efficiency
gain will offset what amount of increased market power. 40 Accu-
rate measurement alone cannot provide an answer unless it can
be translated into market power terms. 41
Professor Williamson's Naive Tradeoff Model supports a
qualitative approach to the tradeoff analysis. Although he does
rates of the various classifications. If market shares of certain sized firms increase, opti-
mal scale is inferred. Similarly, excess or suboptimal scale is inferred from declining mar-
ket shares. The inferences are problematic, however, because factors other than econo-
mies of scale may cause or contribute to firm growth or decline. See G. STIGLER, THE
ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 73 (1968). Cf. Bank, Survival Ability as a Test of Efficiency,
59 Am. ECON. Rlv. 99 (1969); Shepherd, What Does the Survivor Technique Show About
Economies of Scale?, 34 S. EcoN. J. 113 (1967).
137. See Note, supra note 93, at 784.
138. See McGee, supra note 90, at 66; Scherer, supra note 90, at 18; Smith, Survey
of the Empirical Evidence on Economies of Scale, in BusiNEss CONCENTRATION AND
PRICE POLICY 213, 216, 221 (1955).
139. See Note, "Substantially to Lessen Competition .. " Current Problems of
Horizontal Mergers, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1662 (1959) (balancing efficiency with market
power requires court to deal with phenomena which cannot usefully be compared).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
141. Professor Williamson's conclusions, derived from his Naive Tradeoff Model,
attempt just that. He concludes that a small efficiency increase typically overcomes a
relatively larger gain in market power. The finding is supported by measuring the loss to
society only in terms of decreased units of output, while measuring gain in terms of the
entire output of the resulting firm. Thus, the number of post-merger units still produced
will exceed the drop in output resulting from an increase in market power, unless the
price increase is great or demand is very elastic (small price increase causes a substantial
decrease in demand). See Williamson, supra note 26, at 709; Muris, supra note 19, at
386. Williamson's loss analysis is highly controversial and not yet widely accepted. See
supra note 131. See also R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC
NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 920 (2d ed. 1981).
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not urge that quantitative methods can currently be used in liti-
gation,142 the presumption derived from his model that a small
gain in efficiency will generally outweigh larger increases in mar-
ket power leads to the conclusion that efficiency gains should
not be ignored, even if accurate measurement is not feasible. 143
Irrespective of the validity of the Williamson presumption,
a qualitative approach to the efficiency defense is preferable to a
quantitative approach, if only by default. It is unlikely that pre-
sent measurement techniques, involving the ascertainment of
marginal cost differentials,'44 can supply sufficiently conclusive
data to overcome a presumption of illegality created by market
foreclosure evidence. The defense requires a computation of
marginal cost at actual levels of production as well as a compu-
tation of marginal cost at hypothetical (in many cases) produc-
tion levels under a firm that has yet to do business (subsequent
to the merger). 45
Further, courts tend to be more pragmatic than theoretical.
The quantitative data is not likely to be conclusive given the
problems of measurement and the likelihood of conflicting ex-
pert testimony. In the horizontal context, the uncertain quanti-
tative proof must then be measured against direct, hard evi-
dence of anticompetitive effect caused by the elimination of a
market entrant and the concomitant increase in market share to
the new firm. Simply put, the tradeoff analysis is likely to be
one-sided, with the efficiency proponent unlikely to meet its
burden of proof through quantitative means. The difficulties ex-
perienced in establishing a cost justification defense to price dis-
crimination allegations under the Robinson-Patman Act should
be instructive here.
146
142. See Williamson, supra note 26, at 701-03, 728.
143. Id. at 728, 731.
144. Marginal cost is the cost of an additional unit of output or, stated differently,
the change in total cost divided by the change in output. See P. DOOLEY, ELEMENrARY
PRICE THEORY 161 (1967); G. GARB, INTRODUCTION TO MICROECONOMIC THEORY 95 (1968).
Thus, cost savings generated by a merger are ascertained by a comparison of before and
after marginal costs.
145. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 141, at 921.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962); Automatic Can-
teen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68, 79 (1953). But see Morton v. National Dairy Prods.
Corp., 414 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006 (1970); American Motors
Corp. v. FTC, 384 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1012 (1968); FTC v.
Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 371 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1967).
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But the difficulty of accurate measurement does not necessi-
tate exclusion of the defense. Section 7 permits and perhaps re-
quires consideration of the defense,147 and although some case
law may appear to preclude it, General Dynamics and its prog-
eny support the use of efficiency considerations. 148 Further, the
difficulty of comparing dissimilar pro- and anticompetitive ef-
fects has not barred application of a rule of reason analysis in
other areas of antitrust.1 49 The' courts are simply required to
make a judgment as to which effect predominates.
150
147. See supra text accompanying notes 13-22.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 50-58.
149. The classic statement of the rule of reason continues to be the oft-quoted pas-
sage of Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition-or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business in which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular rem-
edy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not
because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the
reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts
and to predict consequences.
See also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). Recent Supreme
Court pronouncements of the rule of reason have focused on the overall effect of the
alleged restraint, governed through a vague, nonscientific balancing of likely anticompe-
titive and procompetitive effects resulting from the practice. See, e.g., Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Soc'y of Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977). While it is recognized that this methodology is intrinsically imprecise, the
continuing adherence to the rule of reason approach stems from judicial recognition that,
for restraints not inherently pernicious, procompetitive results, generally through effi-
ciency gains, may predominate. See id. at 54-56; United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n. 16 (1978).
150. Professor Sullivan has characterized the problem facing courts applying the
rule of reason as follows:
The final question is whether, on balance, the restriction imposed substantially
impedes competition. Where, as here, there seem to be legitimate purposes and
where effects are both adverse and beneficial, the calculus of decision entails
discrimination applied to rather finely shaded gradients. Let us state outright
that if lawyers and judges have scanty qualifications for performing this func-
tion, economists have no better ones. With respect to any given practice ap-
plied in any given market situation, theory and empirical study may be able to
suggest and perhaps validate various effects as either helpful or harmful to
competition or both. But neither theoretical nor empirical material can devise
a single yardstick against which to measure them; this matter must be referred
to the arts rather than the sciences of judgement. Having identified purposes
and effects one looks at length at each of them. Looking upon them openly and
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Frequently, the only procompetitive aspects of non-merger
restraints urged in a rule of reason context trace directly to effi-
ciency gains.151 For example, the balancing required by the
Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.152 entails
a tradeoff analysis that is essentally qualitative. The Court rec-
ognized that vertically imposed customer or territorial limita-
tions restrict intrabrand competition but may enhance inter-
brand competition because of efficiency gains in product
distribution. The Court, however, did not attempt to measure
the efficiency gains, although on the other side, the loss to in-
trabrand competition was readily ascertainable. 53 Although the
Court adopted the rule of reason, it failed to provide any criteria
for its application. Thus, while the qualitative procompetitive
value of efficiency gains was recognized, the necessity of quanti-
fying the gain was not addressed.
The measurement of efficiency gains (which should be the
initial step) cannot be precise with respect to either horizontal
mergers or vertical non-price restraints. Lower federal courts ap-
plying Sylvania have made qualitative judgments about inter-
brand benefits and engaged in qualitative judgments about the
amount of limitation of intrabrand competition and the degree
of enhancement of interbrand competition. 15  The requirement
honestly one must call forth his best and most purposeful intuition. One must
know and say what he can about each and come to some sense about the
weight of each and where the balance lies; one can do no more.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 188.
151. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16
(1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); supra text ac-
companying notes 31-35. See also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344
(1933).
152. 436 U.S. 36 (1977). See also Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S.
320, 334 (1961) (rule of reason analysis for exclusive dealing arrangements because of
potential lower costs for consumers).
153. The significance of the elimination or reduction of intrabrand competition is
dependent on the market share held by the firm in question. The greater that firm's
market share the more suspect are vertically imposed customer or territorial restrictions,
particularly since such restraints eliminate both price and non-price competition among
distributors of that firm's product. See generally Strasser, supra note 36. The elimina-
tion of all forms of competition through vertical non-price restraints parallels the effect
of a horizontal merger where all competition between the acquired and acquiring firm
ceases because of the combination.
154. The district court on remand in Sylvania did just that in ruling the restraint
to be reasonable. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D.
Colo. 1978). See also, e.g., Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itelc Corp., 717 F.2d 1560
(11th Cir. 1983); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980); Del
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of more exact quantification would erode the utility of the rule
of reason by placing an excessive burden of doubtful value, given
the difficulty in the measurement of efficiencies generally,
155
upon the party asserting efficiencies as a procompetitive
justification.
The enhancement of interbrand competition through effi-
ciencies (lower costs) in product distribution presents the same
allocative efficiency issue as does an efficiency engendering hori-
zontal merger. Both cases present the difficulty of determining
how a firm's lower costs are going to impact upon the relevant
market. That issue is typically resolved by looking at the market
position of the firm in question. 156 The resulting benefit, if any,
is then weighed against the anticompetitive effect of the con-
duct. Once again the parallel between vertical non-price re-
straints and horizontal mergers is striking. The anticompetitive
loss in both is horizontal, in a merger through the loss of a com-
petitor and in a vertical restraint through the loss of rivals sell-
ing the same product to the same customers or in the same terri-
tories. The benefit in either case is to interbrand competition in
the relevant market.15 7 Thus, efficiency considerations in hori-
zontal mergers and vertical non-price restraints pose no real an-
alytical differences under the rule of reason.
The utility of an efficiencies defense in merger cases, how-
ever, appears to be limited to those cases with marginal an-
ticompetitive effects. It is arguable that a significant number of
mergers achieving efficiencies result in a market foreclosure too
insignificant to be actionable under section 7. Where both firms
exhibit diseconomies vis-A-vis other market entrants prior to the
merger' 58 it appears unlikely that the market foreclosure from
the acquisition will increase the new firm's market power sub-
stantially enough to warrant a section 7 challenge.1
59
Rio Distrib., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176 (5th cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841
(1979).
155. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
157. If a merger produces efficiencies which create a more competitive market, in-
terbrand competition is enhanced just as where efficiencies achieved in distribution be-
cause of vertically imposed restraints promote competition among different brands.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
159. Merging firms that individually suffer from diseconomies vis-h-vis existing
firms in the market are likely to be "price followers." A merger that overcomes the disad-
vantage promotes competition by increasing the number of firms that determine market
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The market dependence of the efficiency defense further
limits its applicability. If the merged firm surpasses the existing
minimal optimal scale in the market by achieving cost savings
below that of any of its competitors, the position of the resulting
firm in the market must be carefully scrutinized to avoid sanc-
tioning a dominant firm merger through the efficiency defense.
Achievement of a "new" minimal optimal scale is procompetitive
only if the market increase enables the merged firm to achieve
some degree of market parity, as opposed to market dominance.
Internal growth opportunities or the possibility of prefera-
ble alternative mergers would further vitiate the defense where
substantial market foreclosure occurs and the court is not san-
guine that a more competitive alternative is not available. 160 In
addition, substantial market foreclosures would probably doom
the defense given the prospective nature of efficiency claims as
well as the proof problems described above. If an acquisition ap-
pears blatantly anticompetitive, a court faced with comparing
apples and oranges will be loath to sustain an efficiency defense
no matter how nontrivial the economies gained and no matter if
the economies achieved equalize the firm with other market
entrants.
Thus, the defense appears pragmatically useful only in
those cases involving marginal anticompetitive effects. In those
cases qualitative proof of efficiencies, perhaps bolstered by
quantitative measurements, may be outcome determinative.
Proof of the likely existence and probable magnitude16 of new
efficiencies would often offset weak evidence of anticompetitive
effect. For example, a merger that, using the Herfindahl-Hirsch-
man index of market concentration,'62 increases concentration to
price. Thus, the assumption often derived is that the efficiency defense is unnecessary in
that situation because no presumptive illegality can be established. See 4 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, supra note 86, 940; Edwards, supra note 17, at 1560-64; Wentz, supra note
104, at 1548 n.8.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 116-24.
161. See Muris, supra note 19, at 422.
162. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is calculated by summing the squares of the
individual market shares of all the firms in the relevant market. The index thus ranges
from 10,000 in the case of a pure monopoly to an atomistic market number approaching
zero. One advantage of the index is that it reflects the degree of market concentration of
the entire market, including the less dominant entrants. The four-firm concentration ra-
tio adopted in the 1968 Merger Guidelines did not. See U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger
Guidelines (May 30, 1968). The new index does give proportionately greater weight to
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a point where the Justice Department's new Merger Guidelines
are indefinite about the propriety of a challenge to the acquisi-
tion, may present opportunities for the defense if the Depart-
ment does bring suit.163
While these parameters are admittedly nonspecific, they are
in accord with the more generalized rule of reason analysis prev-
alent in other antitrust contexts. That is, if the anticompetitive
effect of a given restraint is substantial, the restraint is very
likely to be ruled unreasonable, regardless of the procompetitive
arguments put forth. Recent rule of reason pronouncements ap-
pear to focus on the finding of any substantial anticompetitive
effect as the sole prerequisite to establishing unreasonable-
ness. 1 4 The efficiency tradeoff analysis would operate similarly.
Dependable proof of nontrivial economies would normally fail to
convince a court to permit a merger resulting in substantial mar-
ket foreclosure and increasing concentration. But that observa-
the large firms' market shares (through the mathematics of squaring the shares). See
-U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493, 28,497 (1982). See also
Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 402 (1983); Miller, Market Structure Variable: An Exposition for Antitrust Practi-
tioners, 27 ANTITRUST BuLL. 593 (1982); Note, An Economic Analysis of the 1982 Justice
Department Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers, 67 MiNN. L. Rav. 749 (1983).
163. Under the Merger Guidelines, two factors are crucial with respect to the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The first is the actual market concentration of the relevant
market as measured by the index. Three broad categories are adopted: (1) index below
1000 (unconcentrated); (2) index between 1000 and 1800 (moderately concentrated); and
(3) index above 1800 (highly concentrated). The second factor relates to the increase in
the index caused by a merger. For example, in the moderately concentrated category
(index between 1000 and 1800) the guidelines state that the Department is more likely
than not to challenge mergers that produce an index increase of more than 100 points.
U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,497 (1982). Thus, where a chal-
lenge in this area is uncertain (e.g., index near 1000 and increase of 100), efficiency gains
should become an important factor. This, of course, suggests that the efficiency "de-
fense" should be utilized as an important factor in the prosecutorial discretion context as
well as in cases actually tried.
An example of the last point arises from the recent purchase by SCM Corporation of
two titanium dioxide plants owned by Gulf and Western Industries, Inc. See supra note
10. Under the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index the overall market would rate as highly con-
centrated (over 1800). The acquisition increased concentration by more than 100 points,
making it likely to be challenged under the Justice Department Merger Guidelines. SCM
argued that the acquisition would be up to 15% more efficient than internal expansion.
FTC economists believed 10% more accurate and FTC accountants thought that the
efficiency gain could be as low as 1%. The Director of the Bureau of Competition refused
to challenge the merger and the Commissioners split 2 to 2 on overturning his decision.
See 45 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 751 (Nov. 10, 1983).
164. The modern version of the rule of reason specifically supports this statement.
See National Soc'yof Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690-92 (1978).
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tion should not obscure the viability of the defense to merger
defendants where the increase in market power is of questiona-
ble section 7 concern.
CONCLUSION
Neither Congress nor the courts have determined that
mergers between competitors are so inherently anticompetitive
as to warrant per se illegality. As with some other types of col-
lective action, horizontal mergers can cause procompetitive effi-
ciencies. Thus, treatment of merger-engendered efficiencies
should be considered under the rule of reason just as efficiencies
are with respect to other non-per se restraints. Although effi-
ciency gains are likely to be decisive in few merger cases, that
does not support their automatic exclusion in an area in which
anticompetitive effects cannot be assumed but must be analyzed
on a case-by-case basis.
The viability of the defense ultimately depends on the will-
ingness of courts to make qualitative judgments about prospec-
tive efficiency gains measured against the likely anticompetitive
effects of increased market shares. Although the contrast of
these counterbalancing factors is acute and may suggest "intrac-
tability," their resolution requires nothing more of the judiciary
than does the rule of reason in antitrust proceedings generally.
